Abstract: Ordered multisignature scheme is a signature scheme to guarantee both validity of an electronic document and its signing order. Although the security of most of such schemes has been proven in the random oracle model, the difficulty of implementation of the random oracle implies that the security should be proven without random oracles, i.e., in the standard model. A straightforward way to construct such schemes in the standard model is to apply aggregate signature schemes. However, the existing schemes based on the CDH problem are inefficient in the sense that the number of computations of the bilinear maps and the length of public keys depend upon the length of (a hash value of) the message. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a CDH-based ordered multisignature scheme which is provably secure in the standard model under a moderate attack model. Its computational cost for the bilinear maps and the size of public key are independent of the length of (a hash value of) the message. More specifically, in comparison with the existing schemes, the public key length is reduced to three group elements from 512 group elements while the computational cost is reduced to 0.85 msec from 1.6 msec.
Introduction

Background
Multisignature scheme [15] is a digital signature scheme that compresses n given signatures on a common message from n signers into a single signature, and it is a primitive suitable for small devices with low computational power or a small amount of storage. An ordered multisignature [11] scheme is one in which the signing order of the signers is recorded and both the validity of the message and the signing order are verified. This primitive is useful for various applications such as interdomain routing protocols. As described in Section 7, one of possible applications is for securing border-gateway protocol (BGP) [24] , named data-plane security [12] . One of requirements for BGP is a policy [12] where operators specify which routes are advertised to neighboring networks, and the data-plane security is aimed to reject packets through invalid routes that are not advertised. Intuitively, the packets should be sent via only routers matching the policy, and the order verifiability of ordered multisignatures is useful for verifying actual packet forwarding. Although the security of the most ordered multisignature schemes has been proven in the random oracle model [3] , Canetti et al. showed a negative result [10] that there exist signature and encryption schemes, that are secure in the random oracle model but for which any imple- okamoto@risk.tsukuba.ac.jp mentation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. This result implies that the security should be proven without random oracles, and such a model is called standard model.
According to Ref. [6] one may imagine that an ordered multisignature scheme can be simply constructed from aggregate signatures [8] , which are digital signatures where any party given n signatures of n messages from n users can combine all of these signatures into a single short signature. Particularly, each document is concatenated with the signer's position in the group and then signed using an aggregate signature scheme. These generated signatures are then aggregated into an ordered multisignature. Several aggregate signature schemes have been proposed in the standard model, and ordered multisignature schemes are constructed from these schemes. In this approach, Ahn et al. [1] and Lu et al. [18] have respectively proposed aggregate signature schemes based on CDH problem. However, these schemes are impractical. In the scheme by Ahn et al. the number of the computationally heavy bilinear map operations increases linearly with the length of (a hash value of) the message. In the scheme by Lu et al. the size of the public key is larger than the packet limitation of BGP.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a secure ordered multisignature scheme in the standard model, that is not constructed from aggregate signature schemes, under a moderate attack model as long as the CDH assumption holds. Our proposed scheme is efficient in terms of both the communication and the computational costs, and we believe that the proposed scheme is the most practical one for possible applications described in Section 7.
For the communication cost, we note that the signature size is independent of the number of signers, and the signature always consists of three elements of a group G. The length of the public key is independent of the length of (a hashed value of) the message and also consists of three elements in G. Most CDH-based schemes are based on the Waters signature scheme [29] , and the public keys in those schemes depend on the length of the message. The length of the message is based on the binary length of the elements in G, and there are 160 elements in each public key with 80-bit security and 512 elements for 128-bit security. Hence, the communication efficiency is diminished in trivial constructions based on the Waters signature scheme. In contrast, in our scheme, by removing the Waters hash function from the public keys, we reduced the number of elements for the public key to less than 1%: to three elements (1,536 bits) from 512 elements (263,168 bits).
For the computational cost, we estimate the total computations cost, including both signing and verification. There is a high computational cost for the bilinear maps used in verification, but in our scheme, the number of computations of the bilinear maps is independent of both the message length and the number of signers: our scheme requires only four bilinear map computations, regardless of the length of the message or the number of signers. The time for each computation of bilinear maps is about 6.398 msec, even with the latest software library and hardware, such as the University of Tsukuba Elliptic Curve and Pairing Library (TEPLA) [14] and a Core i7 3960X. As described above, multisignatures are primarily of use for devices with low computational power and little storage, and so it is important to reduce the number of operations with a high computational cost. The scheme by Ahn et al. [1] requires eleven bilinear map computations, but our scheme requires only four bilinear map computations. We therefore estimate the total computational cost for our scheme will be about half of that for the existing scheme which is available for a realistic scenario.
Our construction is based on the following observation. Conditions to construct an ordered multisignature scheme secure in the standard model under the CDH assumption is to be a signature scheme such that a signature consists of three separable components, i.e., a three-partitioned signature. The three-partitioned signature allows us to remove the Waters hash from the public key and also to use the technique of the existing efficient scheme. The security can be proven by the technique of the existing schemes which is utilized as building blocks in our construction.
As a possible application of the proposed scheme, we describe the following scenario. The application is for securing the BGP; in this application, signers correspond to routers. According to Sriram et al. [27] , routers have little computational power, which makes it difficult for them to sign and to verify signatures. In this application, since our scheme has a smaller public key than the packet limitation of the BGP in comparison with the existing scheme whose public key size is larger than the packet limitation of BGP. In addition, the number of bilinear map computations is independent of the number of signers and the message length, we believe that the efficiency of our proposed scheme makes the application possible. We introduce the detail of the application in Section 7.
This is a full version of Ref. [30] we published in the Computer Security Symposium (CSS) 2012.
Related Work
The multisignature scheme was proposed by Itakura and Nakamura [15] , and the security was formalized by Ohta and Okamoto [23] and Boldyreva [5] .
The aggregate signature scheme, which is a generalized multisignature, was proposed by Mitomi and Miyaji [20] , and Boneh et al. [8] proposed a scheme with bilinear maps. Ordered multisignature schemes can be constructed from aggregate signature schemes, and schemes such as RSA, which are based on permutations, seem to be more efficient and thus have a lower computational cost. However, the permutation-based schemes [2] , [9] , [19] , [22] do not support the order flexibility defined by Mitomi and Miyaji [20] , and so the number of signers is impossibly restricted. In contrast, the existing schemes based on bilinear maps support the order flexibility and the same public key can be used for all signing order.
Several schemes in the standard model, including aggregate signature schemes, have been proposed [1] , [17] , [18] , [25] , [26] . To increase security, the scheme should be based on the wellstudied problem, such as the CDH problem, which are found only in Refs. [1] , [18] . However, the number of computations of the bilinear maps in the scheme by Ahn et al. [1] and the number of elements of the public key in the scheme by Lu et al. [18] both increase linearly with the length of the message.
As an investigation of security of the S-BGP, Boldyreva and Lychev [7] formalized it and proved the relation between the unforgeability of the signatures and the security.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present some background on groups with bilinear maps and its security assumption.
Notations
Let the number of signers be n. We denote by V a verifier, by m a message to be signed, by m i the i-th bit of the message m, by σ i the signature generated by the i-th signer, by pk i the public key of the i-th signer, by sk i the secret key of the i-th signer and by a b a concatenation of elements a and b, where the concatenation can be easily divided into the original elements a and b. We define ψ i := pk 1 · · · pk i to be the signing order from the first signer to the i-th signer, and denote by |ψ i | the number of signers in ψ i .
Bilinear Maps
Let G and G T be groups with the same prime order p. We then define bilinear maps and bilinear groups as follows: Definition 1 (Bilinear maps). A bilinear map e : G × G → G T is a map such that the following conditions hold, where g is a generator of G:
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u, v ∈ G.
In this paper, we say that G is a bilinear group if all these conditions hold, and we assume that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in bilinear groups is hard. We call the parameter (p, G, G T , e) pairing parameter.
Security Assumption
The CDH assumption is defined as follows. Definition 2 ((t, )-CDH assumption in G). We define the CDH problem in bilinear groups with a security parameter 1 k as follows: for a given (g, g a , g b ) ∈ G with uniformly random a, b ∈ Z p and a pairing parameter (p, G, G T , e) as input, compute g ab , where
p is a prime order of G. We say the (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G if and only if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the CDH problem in G with the execution time t with probability greater than .
Waters Hash Function
The Waters hash function [29] is the following function consisting + 1 generators, where is the length of a message. A scheme based on the CDH problem in the standard model can be constructed via the security proof utilizing this function.
Waters Hash Function:
The collision resistance was proven in Ref. [13] . In the scheme by Lu et al. [18] , each signer has the personalized one, which is with trapdoors (x , x 1 , · · · , x ) such that u i = g xi holds for any generator g ∈ G, as a part of its own public key. However, such a construction increases the length of the public key in proportion to the message length.
Signature Scheme by Waters
In this section, we recall the signature scheme by Waters [18] , which is a variant of the Waters signature scheme [29] . The scheme utilizes the Waters hash function described above, and hence a message in the scheme will be dealt as a bit-string of the form {0, 1} for all .
Setup: Given a security parameter 1 k , generate a pairing parameter (p, G, G T , e), and choose a random generator g 1 , g 2 ∈ G and
as a public key pk and g αW 2 as a corresponding secret key. Signing: Given sk and a message m, parse m as a bit-string (m 1 , · · · , m ) ∈ {0, 1} . Pick a random number r ← Z p and compute as follows:
Output σ = (S , R) as a signature on m.
Verification: Given m, σ and pk, parse m as a bit-string (m 1 , · · · , m ) ∈ {0, 1} and σ as (S , R). Check that the following equation holds:
If the equation holds, output accept. Otherwise, output reject. In Ref. [29] , Waters has proven that this scheme is secure if the CDH assumption holds.
Ordered Multisignature
In this section, we explain a syntax of the ordered multisignature schemes, define its security, and describe a technical problem for constructing the ordered multisignatures. Hereafter, we assume that each user has a single public key, and denote by pk i i-th signer without loss of generality.
The Syntax
Ordered multisignature scheme consists of the following algorithms, where i satisfies 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Setup: Given security parameter 1 k , generate a public parameter para. Key Generation: Given para, generate a secret key sk i and its corresponding public key pk i .
Signing: Given a secret key sk i , a public key pk i , a message m, a multisignature σ from the previous signers, and a signing order ψ i−1 , generate a signature σ. Finally, set ψ i = ψ i−1 pk i and output the signature σ on m in ψ i .
Verification: Given m, σ and ψ n , output accept or reject.
Correctness:
In an ordered multisignature scheme, we say that the scheme is correct if, for all para, sk i and pk i given by Setup and Key Generation, Verification(m, Signing(sk i , pk i , m, σ , ψ i−1 ), ψ i ) outputs accept.
Security Model
In this model, there exists an adversary A and a challenger C. Our model is a variant of the certified key model [5] . The certified key model is a model supported by public key infrastructure (PKI) and assumes that each user knows a secret key corresponding its own public key * 1 . More precisely, C has a list L of certified keys that is used to register users and their own public keys. A can know all secret keys corresponding to public keys included in L except for the one given by C. A's advantage is equal to the probability that C outputs accept in the following game. We will denote by x (i) the value of the i-th query for all x. Similarly as the existing model of ordered multisignatures [6] , our security model guarantees authenticity of the message signed by an honest signer and its position i in a path, but not which signers signed before or will sign after the i-th signer. We do not consider switching of the positions among colluding malicious signers. For instance as shown in Ref. [6] , there are malicious signers corresponding to pk 1 and pk 3 colluding each other against an honest signer corresponding to pk 2 . Signers corresponding to pk 1 and pk 3 may be able to compute some signature σ on m in ψ 2 = pk 1 pk 2 after obtaining σ * on m in ψ * 3 = (pk 3 pk 2 ) pk 1 . To the best of our
There exist models providing stronger security such that there is no such an assumption. However, PKI-based security based on the key registration model is realistic and constructing schemes secure under the stronger security is an open problem.
knowledge, there is no DLP-based scheme preventing the switching of the positions among colluding malicious signers. Namely, constructing such a DLP-based scheme remains an open problem. We note that, according to Ref. [6] , this security model seems to be acceptable in the application described in Section 7.
Initial Phase: The challenger C generates a public parameter para by Setup and a pair of challenger keys (sk * , pk * ) by using Key Generation. Then, C initializes L := pk * , and runs A with para and pk * as input.
Certification Query: A generates (sk i , pk i ), and sends them to C. Then, C registers pk i in L if sk i is a secret key corresponding to pk i .
Signing Query:
i−1 ) as the h-th query for the challenge key pk * , where the following conditions hold for the query i satisfies
The sining query is given by A to C together with the public key pk * . C runs Sign-
, and obtains σ and ψ
i . Output: After iterating over the above steps, A outputs a forgery (m * , σ * , ψ * n ). Here, let the target signer be the i * -th signer in ψ * n , and let the following conditions hold for the forgery:
holds * 2 , where ψ * i * −1 is extracted from ψ * n as a signer structure from the first signer to the signer previous to the target signer; ψ * n includes pk
no pk j appears more than once in ψ * n . If all these conditions hold, then C outputs accept. Otherwise, C outputs reject. Definition 3. We say that an adversary A breaks an ordered multisignature scheme with (t, q c , q s , , n, ) if and only if a challenger C outputs accept, in the security game described above within the execution time t and with probability greater than . Here, A can generate at most q c certification queries and at most q s signing queries, is the length of the message output by A, and n is the number of signers included in the forgery.
Difficulty of Constructing Ordered Multisignatures
Ordered multisignatures guarantee the signing order in addition to the validity of a message for standard multisignatures. In a trivial construction, this capability can be constructed from signing both the message and the signing order by utilizing the fulldomain hash schemes such as the aggregate signature scheme by Boneh et al. [8] . However, the number of computations of the bilinear maps in such an approach becomes linear with respect to the number of signers. Although a scheme [18] using the Waters * 2 We should discuss (m * , ψ *
as a natural security requirement. However, until the publication of Ref. [30] , there is no scheme achieving the requirement in the standard model, and constructing such a scheme is an open problem. In this paper, we discuss
as in Ref. [30] . Even such a moderate model is not discussed in the standard model signature schemes [1] , [18] . Through a discussion under this model, we prove that a proposed scheme guarantees the validity of messages signed by an honest signer and his/her positions in the signing order.
hashes with trapdoors as public keys is efficient in terms of the computational cost, the length of the public keys in the scheme becomes linear.
Proposed Scheme
Our Approach
In our approach, signature components are partitioned into three parts, i.e., each of which is related to either secret key, message or the signing order, and each part can be operated individually. We call such a construction "three-partitioned signature". This is for the following reasons: (1) taking the Waters hash into the public parameter from the public keys and (2) combining the Boldyreva et al.'s technique described below. The threepartitioned construction allows us to utilize both techniques by utilizing individual components.
We describe more details below. The reason why the length of the public key is long in the scheme by Lu et al. [18] is the use of the Waters hash functions with trapdoors described in Section 2.4. In order to reduce the length of the public keys, the Waters hash functions with trapdoors should be removed from the public keys. In this approach, we found a fact that the trapdoors of the Waters hash functions are unnecessary for compressing the signatures, because the messages is common strings among the signers. Namely, the Waters hash can be taken into the public parameter using only the message component from signers' public keys, and hence the public key length becomes independent of the message length. This construction also gives a benefit that the number of the computations of bilinear maps becomes independent of both the length of the message in comparison to the scheme by Ahn et al. [1] .
Meanwhile, we need a technique to verify the signing order. The idea to address this is the second reason. Actually, we can use the technique of the ordered multisignature scheme proposed by Boldyreva el al. [6] in order to construct a scheme in the standard model, while the scheme by Boldyreva et al. is a construction in the random oracle model. Their scheme utilizes indexes representing the positions of signers to verify the signing order, and is efficient in the sense of the fixed number of computations of the bilinear maps. Here, we found that the random oracles are no longer required if we consider only a component of the signing order. Therefore, the number of the bilinear map computation is independent of both the message length and the number of the signers, while the capability for verifying the signing order is provided.
Construction of the Scheme
We assume that there exists a trusted center to generate the public parameter. A message m in this scheme will be dealt with as a bit-string of the form {0, 1} for all . We can also let the message length be the output length of a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} .
Setup: Given 1 k , this algorithm generates the pairing parameter (p, G, G T , e) described in Section 2.2 and generates random generators g 1 , g 2 ∈ G and
The algorithm outputs (p, G, G T , e, g 1 , g 2 , u , u 1 , · · · , u ) as the public parameter. = ∅ are set * 3 , and the following verification step is skipped. Next, the algorithm verifies that the received signature σ is a valid signature on m in ψ i−1 by using Verification for n = i − 1. If Verification outputs reject, this algorithm aborts the process. Otherwise, the algorithm generates a random number r i ← Z * p and computes the following:
Key Generation
Finally, the algorithm sets
), this algorithm parses m as an -bit string (m 1 , · · · , m ) ∈ {0, 1} and σ as (S n , R n ). The algorithm extracts each signer's public key (
and verifies that the following equation holds:
If not, the algorithm outputs reject. Otherwise, the output is accept.
More Construction
In some applications, even the size of the public parameter becomes a bottleneck. In order to reduce the parameter size, we can adopt the Naccache approach [21] . In this construction, the messages are divided into chunks of λ bits. The size of λ is 32 bits, and, for 128-bit security, the public parameter can be reduced from 256 generators to eight generators.
We do not provide the details of the scheme construction and the security proof, but these can be obtained similarly as Ref. [21] . The Naccache approach decreases the reduction cost in the security proof. Hence, we have to utilize the approach carefully.
Security Analysis
We now prove that the proposed scheme is secure in the standard model. The proof is similar as the Theorem 1 in Ref. [18] and the Theorem 3.3 in Ref. [6] . Theorem 4. The proposed ordered multisignature scheme is the (t, q c , q s , , n, )-secure if (t CDH , CDH )-CDH assumption in G holds, where * 3 We assume that pkk ∈{pk
where t e is the computational cost for one exponentiation computation, t p is the computational cost for one bilinear map and e is the base of natural logarithm.
Proof. We describe a proof sketch. We construct an algorithm B, given a challenge of the CDH problem, to solve the CDH problem. We assume that an adversary A who breaks the proposed scheme with (t, q c , q s , l, n, ) exists. From the definition of the forgery, without the loss of generality, the output by A can be classified as follows:
. For case 1, B generates a challenge in the Waters signature scheme [29] , the Waters challenge for short, by using the challenge in the CDH problem, and then generates a challenge in the proposed scheme from the Waters challenge. On the other hand, for case 2, B directly generates a challenge in the proposed scheme from the CDH challenge without generating the Waters challenge. Then B runs A with the challenge in either case. We also analyze the probabilities and the execution time that B successes to solve the problem, (t , ) for case 1 and (t , ) for case 2. Then, we compute the whole probability CDH and the whole computational time t CDH .
Without the loss of generality, we assume that there exists exactly one signer, the target signer, for which A does not know the secret key. B has the list L of certified-keys, and for all x, we denote the value of the j-th query by x ( j) . B interacts with A as follows: (case 1): We construct an algorithm B to break the Waters signature scheme using A. This step is almost same as the proof in Ref. [18] . q c , q s , l, n, ) 
Lemma 5. The proposed scheme is (t,
Certification Query: For any signer, A generates a secret key sk i = (g If all these equations hold, pk i is registered to the public key list L. Otherwise, the output is ⊥.
Signing Query: This step is almost the same as that in Ref. [18] . R i = R and computes as follows:
These values can be written as follows:
where r is a secret random number. B outputs (S i , R i ) as an ordered multisignature for pk * .
Output: Also this step is almost the same as that in Ref. [18] . 
Finally, B outputs (S * W , R * W ) as a forgery for the Waters signature scheme. The success probability W and an execution time t W of B are given similarly as that of the method in Ref. [18] . There is no event in which B aborts the simulation. Therefore, W = and q Ws = q s hold. The execution time t W is given from that of A plus two exponentiation computations and two bilinear map computations for Certification Query, two exponentiation computations for Signing Query and two exponentiation computation for the final step. Therefore, t W = t + (2q c + 2q s + 2)t e + 2q c t p , where t e is the computational cost for the exponentiation.
Here, We note the following theorem [29] .
Theorem 6. The Waters signature scheme is (t, q, )-secure if (t , )-CDH assumption holds, where t = t and = 16(l+1)q .
Proof (Sketch).
The proof is given in Ref. [29] . This theorem implies that, when the proposed scheme is broken, we can construct an algorithm to solve the CDH problem with (t , ), where t = t+(3q c +2q s +2)t e +2q c t p and = 16(l+1)qs .
(case 2): This proof is based on the proof in Ref. [6] . 
−t * k * g v * and A * = g a as the public key pk * of the target signer. This means that B sets implicitly g a 2 as the target signer's secret key. Then, B runs A with (p, G, G T , e, g 1 , g 2 
Certification Query: This step is the same as that of (case 1). Signing Query: This step is almost the same as that in Ref. [6] . B checks that i (h) = k * holds, where i (h) is the position of the target signer for the h-th query. If so, B aborts the process. Otherwise, B discards a signature given from A. Then, B generates a random number r ← Z p and computes as follows:
Let r := r − b t * (i−k * ) , and firstly the following equations hold from Initial Phase as a part of S i :
Then, the following equation holds:
B returns (S i , R i ) as an ordered multisignature for pk * .
Output: A outputs a forgery σ * = (S * , R * ) on a message m * in ψ * n , and let the target signer be i * -th signer in ψ * n where ψ * i * is extracted from ψ * n . If i * = k * , B can solve the CDH problem since the forgery can be written as follows:
where r is a secret value in the exponent of R * . Then, B can solve the CDH problem by the following computation:
The success probability of B is = Pr[(
n . Here, we analyze 1 − 1 n qs 1 n similarly as the proof in Ref. [6] . Then, = · 1 e(qs−1) holds from the derived function with respect to n and its extremum. The B's execution time t is that of A plus three exponentiation computations and two bilinear maps for Certification Query, nine exponentiation computations for Signing Query and two exponentiation for the final step. Therefore, t = t + (3q c + 9q s + 2)t e + 2q c t p holds.
Analysis of Whole Probability: In order to success for each case, B needs that either one of the following events occurs: B chooses (case 1) and A's output is for (case 1); B chooses (case 2) and A's output is for (case 2). Here, let the probability that B chooses (case 1) be β and the probability that A's output is for (case 1) be α. From Lemma 5, Theorem 6 and Lemma 7, . The computational time t CDH can be obtained as the larger value between t and t . Therefore, t CDH = max{t , t } = t = t + (3q c + 9q s + 2)t e + 2q c t e holds.
Evaluation
We compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the existing ordered multisignature schemes, which are straightforwardly obtained from the aggregate signature schemes, in the standard model [1] , [18] with respect to the signing cost, the verification cost, the signature size, and the size of the public key * 4 . Here, for the signing and the verification costs, we compare these schemes in terms of the number of computations of the bilinear maps and the number of exponentiation computations.
As shown in Table 1 , in comparison with Refs. [1] , [18] , the number of computations of the bilinear maps for the verification cost and the size of the public keys in our scheme are independent of the length of the message. Although for our proposed scheme, the number of exponentiation is linear with respect to the number of signers, in general, the cost of the exponentiation much less than that of computations of the bilinear maps. In addition, the costs of the exponentiation computations can be reduced via the Pippenger algorithm [4] . * 4 Actually, the form of the evaluation is different from that in Ref. [18] . We evaluated an optimized scheme whose form of the public key is the same as that of our proposed scheme.
For instance, we compare concrete values in Table 2 in the case of 20 signers, which is a typical number of signers in the S-BGP (see Section 7) . The values in Table 2 are given relative to the benchmark of TEPLA [14] . Table 3 shows total costs of the schemes for 20 signers in the BGP application described in Section 7. The total communication costs of the scheme by Lu et al. are 657,048 bytes, which is larger than the packet limitation 4,096 bytes of BGP UPDATE [16] . Furthermore, in comparison with Ahn et al.'s scheme, as described in Fig. 1 , the computational time of our scheme is roughly half. Thus, our proposed scheme is the most practical in the existing CDH-based schemes.
Applications
One of the possible applications of an ordered multisignature scheme is an improvement of secure-border gateway protocol (S-BGP) [16] , which is a variant of BGP where each AS sign path information corresponding to the policy. Whereas S-BGP enforces ASes to authenticate their own paths, Feamster et al. [12] pointed out that S-BGP provides only a weak security: in particular, an AS router should reject the packets from invalid sources. They called such a new capability the data-plane security, and it is a more advanced primitive where the validity of the actual forwarding path for data packets can be guaranteed. Namely, an advantage of the data-plane security is that packets are certainly forwarded along with the authenticated path information.
According to Boldyreva et al. [6] , ordered multisignatures seem to be suitable for the data-plane security: more specifically, in order to provide the data-plane security, ASes can sign the data packets by using an ordered multisignature scheme where the signing order represents the actual forwarding path and the packets themselves correspond to messages. More precisely, each packet includes a source address and a destination address, and these information in the packet is signed by egress routers of ASes forwarding it. The egress routers insert their signatures and public key information into the data packets. Ingress routers receiving the packets forward only packets with valid ordered multisignatures that followed an authenticated path, where the routers check that the validity of the signatures with the their own path information as the signing order. If the verification algorithm rejects the signatures, the ingress routers will eliminate the packets. Finally, the origin AS of the packets verifies that the packet actually took an authenticated path to reach its destination. In comparison with standard signatures such as ECDSA or standard multisignatures, by virtues of the order verifiability and an aggregation of the signatures, ordered multisignatures allow reduction of the computational overloads and verification of records of the packet forwarding.
This application is different from the traditional S-BGP. The data-plane security guarantees the validity of the actual path which forwards the packets while the traditional S-BGP guarantees only the validity of the path information in routers. The cost for signing the data packets is larger than that for the paths, because there is a far larger amount of data in comparison to the path information.
The application described above can be achieved by the proposed scheme. The scheme by Lu et al. is that the size of the public key is larger than the limitation of the packet size of the BGP, which is 4,096 bytes. Meanwhile, the scheme by Ahn et al. requires a large amount of the computational time, whose cost is about twofold relatively to our scheme. In other words, the fastest scheme which is available for securing BGP is our proposed scheme.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an ordered multisignature scheme without the random oracles. Most of the existing ordered multisignature schemes adopt the random oracle model to analyze security, and, to the best of our knowledge, the existing CDHbased schemes are impractical for obtaining the data-plane security of the S-BGP, which is the main application. Also, to the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first CDH-based scheme that achieves all of the following conditions: rigorous security analysis in the standard model under the moderate attack model, a fixed number of computations of the bilinear maps, and a fixed size to the public key with respect to the length of the message. These results mean that our scheme is the best to use for the application described in Section 7. We plan to discuss a scheme not requiring the moderate attack model and to extend the method to allow for more complicated structures of signers, e.g., a hierarchical structure. We also plan to propose an identity-based ordered multisignature scheme, similar to the schemes in Ref. [28] in the standard model.
Editor's Recommendation
The authors propose an efficient ordered multi-signature scheme, whose public key size is independent of the number of signers and the length of message. Multi-signature schemes have been investigated in cryptography for a long time, but the proposed scheme is the most efficient one which is proved secure under the standard model based on CDH assumption. This result is a milestone in the research of multi-signatures, and we expect that this paper provides further research developments in cryptography.
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